Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant)
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is Immanuel Kant's preliminary text on the subject of ethics - his proposal of a non-empirical foundation for morals. In preparation of a critical examination of ethics, Kant aimed to deduce the supreme principle of morality, as an unconditional moral imperative for people's actions. With a view to appraising all other moral principles in light of this basic principle, he wrote this groundwork as a separate and independent justification of his foundation for ethics. Pure practical philosophy In his systematic approach to knowledge, Kant distinguished all subjects of rational investigation into two parts: formal knowledge, occupied solely with the rules for thinking regardless of the specific objects of investigation, and material knowledge, occupied with the description and explanation of specific subjects. The material parts were seen by Kant as directed only toward two distinct classes of objects: nature, as studied by physics, and freedom, as studied by ethics. The latter is the subject of the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Kant also distinguished knowledge on the grounds of its source: empirical knowledge arises from experience whereas pure knowledge comes from elsewhere (as argued in other works, this other origin of knowledge is from the formal constitution of the inquiring mind). He regarded logic as exclusively pure philosophy but was careful to separate the pure study of ethics or physics from their respective empirical studies. The former part of material philosophy was regarded as metaphysics (either of morals or of nature). As such, pure and formal philosophy is logic while pure and material philosophy is metaphysics. As a division of labor, Kant asserted the need to separate inquiry into pure knowledge of morals from empirical knowledge of morals and the priority of a metaphysics of morals before an empirical ethics. Absolute necessity of morals In grounding ethics on pure principles, Kant assumes certain basic principles, one of which he states outright in the introductory chapter of the groundwork: "A law, if it holds morally, that is, as a ground of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity." (GMM 4:389) In short, an ought that is moral cannot be contingent and a contingent norm cannot be a moral one. Indeed, the concept of a categorical imperative implies a norm that is not contingent, as distinct from imperatives that are hypothetical or assertoric which only ought to be followed if pursuing some specific end. In this respect, a moral ought is seen by Kant as an ought that must be satisfied regardless of the expectations or motivations of the person under its obligation. This quality of absolute necessity is distinct from the commonly attributed quality of being obligatory regardless of the circumstances or consequences. The latter may apply to moral laws in the Kantian view but this attribution is not the same as attributing absolute necessity to those laws. This assumption about moral oughts permeates the entire Kantian project of ethics and underlies many of the arguments presented in the groundwork. His most immediate inference from this principle is that morality can only be grounded in pure knowledge, without dependence on anything empirical. This a priori basis for ethics distinguishes Kantian ethics from many other theories of right.Category:Works (Kant)